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IN THE

S~UPREME

COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD FOX,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

J. K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire
Department of Salt Lake City,
SAL'T LAKE CITY, a municipal .
corporation,

Cas·e No. 7533

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
These_ same parties were before this .court in an
original proceeding to review the action of the Civil
Service Commission of Salt Lake City in setting aside
the resignation of plaintiff Harold Fox from the Fire
Department of Salt Lake City. The decision of the court
in that proceeding is reported in 208 P. 2d. 1~23. After
that decision was handed down, plaintiff brought the
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present action in the District Court of Sa~t Lake County
to set aside and avoid his resignation from the Salt Lake
City Fire Department.
On August ·6, ·1948, plaintiff deliveTed to defendant

J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Salt Lake City Fire Department, his resignation in writing, effective immediately
(see Exhibit "A" received in evidence page 40), reading as follows :
"Effective this date I hereby tender my resignation .from the Salt Lake City Fire Department.''
The N·ext Day he mailed to Chief Piercey and ·Salt
Lake City a letter purporting to withdraw his resignation, which letter was received August 9, 1948. This
letter is Exhibit '' B '' {page________ ), and reads as follows:
''On August 6th I tendered to you my resignation from the Salt Lake City Fire Department.
''This is to inform you that I hereby withdraw my resignation from the Salt Lake City
Fire Department and request that you disregard
my letter of resignation dated August 6, 1948."
No mention of duress or over re~aching in the procurement of the resignation is mentioned in the letter of
withdrawal. The resignation is refered to as being a
regular resignation, otherwise affective unless withdrawn before acceptance.
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In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges, as the
basis for setting this resignation aside as follows:
''That on the 6th day of August, 1948 defendant J. K. Piercey sum1noned plaintiff into his
office and there stated to plaintiff that unless he
resigned his position as a fireman first grade in
the Salt Lake City Fire Department that he would
blast and smear plaintiff in every ne,vspaper in
Salt Lake City; said defendant further stated to
plaintiff that he would make it so miserable that
plaintiff could not secure a job in said city and
that if plaintiff did not resign his position said
defendant would discharge him and give him more
publicity than he had ever wanted in his life.''
In paragraph III of said complaint, plaintiff alleges:
''That the aforementioned threats by defendant J. K. Piercey created in plaintiff great fear
for his own economic welfare and the economic
welfare of his family, and plaintiff's fear was of
such intensity that plaintiff involuntarily and
while under the influence of the duress and threat
of defendant J. K. Piercey signed a letter of resignation effective immediately, which had been prepared for his signature by said J. K. Piercey
and delivered the same to J. K. Piercey.''
Plaintiff's complaint seeks to avoid the resignation
because of specific threats made by Chief Piercey to
blast plaintiff in every newspaper in Salt Lake City and
to make it so miserable for him that he could not secure a
job in said City. According to his complaint it was these
threats of what Mr. Piercey would do that produced the
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fear in plaintiff's mind, that overcame his will and made
his act of resigning involuntary, under duress.
However, in its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court
specifically found that defendant Piercey did not state to
plaintiff that Piercey "would blast and smear plaintiff
in every paper in Salt Lake City," nor did he state that
he, Piercey, ''would make it so plaintiff could not secure
a job in Salt Lake ·City.'' It will thus be seen that the
court finds that the very threats relied upon by plaintiff
as the basic elements that produced the fear and duress
that caused him to act involuntarily in submitting his
resignation in fact were never made.
There is no dispute as to the fact that at about 11 :00
A.M. on August 6, 1948, Fox was summoned by Chief
Piercey to the latter's office. There weTe present Chief
Piercey, ·Assistant Chiefs White, Smith, Thompson and
Ward and the Plaintiff. Nor is there any substantial dispute as to the reason for Fox being summoned to ~appear
(P. 52-53). He had been placed in jail the night of August 5, 1948, charg-ed with being drunk. He had had an
altercation at his home with a neighbor lady, slapping
heT, and his son had fired a 22-caliber gun in an attempt
to stop the fracas. His wife had phoned for the police
(P. 67), and he was taken to the jail. Because of this
situation Chief Piercey asked him to report at his office.
There his past record and the 30 demerits which had been
given him previously were discussed with him as well
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as the incidents of the night before. In detailing what
was said there plaintiff's testimony is in h-armony with
the ·allegations of his complaint. He testified (P. 37) that
Piercey asked if he was going to resign. H·e answered,
''No, I wasn't going to resign.'' Piercey then said:
''He told me I haQ. to work somewhere; that
I wasn't going to work there no more, and if I
didn't resign I 'vas going to be discharged, and
I told him I wouldn't resign. '' ''He told me if
I didn't resign he was going to blast me and make
it miserable for me to find a job. I told him I
wouldn't resign.''
He persisted in his refusal to resign and was told
to be back at 1:30 for his discharge. He came back and
was handed a letter of discharge by As'sistant Chief
Ward at the request of Chief Piercey, after the latter
had explained the rules of the Civil Service Commission
relating to discharge (P. 38). Fox took the letter of discharge and left the office. After le-aving the office Fox
changed his mind. He testified:
''Rather than h·ave Chief Piercey carry out hh;
threats, the be·st thing to do was to resign and save face
with the family." (P. 39). So Fox returned and
asked if it was too late to resign and if he (Piercey)
would retract his stories he was going to put in the newspapers if Fox resigned. Piercey said he would try and
have his secretary draw up a resignation (Exhibit "A'').
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vVhen asked by his counsel what the primary consideration was in signing the resignation, Fox replied
(P. 40) :

"I didn't want him (Piercey) to carry out his
threats on me. ' '
Fox~

Q.

"By 'threats' what do you n1ean Mr.

A.

''He said he would blast me and smear me all
over the newspapers and if he did, it would be
difficult in obtaining employment."

On cross-examination plaintiff testified that his will
to resist was not overcome at the time he left the morning
meeting on August 6th (P. 56), even though it was at
that meeting that the so called threats w-ere made, according to. his testimony. He stated he would fight the case
rather than resign. At the afternoon appointment he
-accepted the leter of dis-charge and then declared he
would resist the discharge. A short time later he returned to the Chief's office and told the Chief:
''If he wouldn't put that story in the newspapers that he would resign." (P. 57)
He further testified that it was fear of what might
be published in the· newspapers that prompted his resignation (P. 62), although anything defendant Piercey
might caus-e to be published to smear him would be lies
(P. 59). About 7 or 8 hours after submitting his resignation (P. 61) he decided to withdraw it. His fear of adverse publicity then 'vas allayed. When asked what was
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in his mind that convinced him he need not fear adv-erse
publicity, he stated:
"He, (Piercey) withdrew his discharge and
I had a perfect right to 'vithdraw my resignation,
\vhich 'vould give me a chance to have my job
back.''
Q.

''You figured that now, since you had resigned he wouldn't publish anything, and you
could then safely withdra'v your resignation,
is that what you mean~''

A.

''That is right.''

It is apparent from this testimony that plaintiffwas
not afraid of the consequences of a mere discharg·e and
that it was the threats which he claims Mr. Piercey made
of smearing- him and making it miserable for him to
obtain employment that overpowered his will and made
his resignation involuntary. As already p·ointed out,
however, the Trial Court specifically found that the
Chief made no such threa'ts and so must have disbelieved
all that Mr. Fox testified to on that subject.
Since Mr. Fox's testimony was found to be unw.orthy
of belief it becomes necessary to examine the testimony
of ·Chief Piercey _and the four Assistant Chiefs as to
what was said at the morning meeting on August 6th
relative to the effect a dis.carge would have on the matter
of adverse publicity and Fox being unab-le to procure
employment.
Chief Piercey testified (P. 69-70) that at the morning meeting he informed pl·aintiff that it was the decision
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the Board of Chief officers that plaintiff should be
discharged; that plaintiff would have to work some place
and if he resigned it would not be necessary to present
the case to the Civil Service Commission. The procedure
prescribed by the CivjJ Service rules on discharge was
reviewed .and the Chief stated he would h·ave to specify
and give charges upon which a discharge would be based.
The netvspapers were never mentioned. The Chief, and
all 4 Assistant Chiefs (Thompson P. 107, Ward P. 124,
Smith P. 136, White P. 147) denied that anything was
s.aid about blasting plaintiff in the newspapers or making
it miserable for him to get a job. The Chief told Fox that
if he were dis-charged the facts would he brought out
and would be public property (P. 84). but the Chief himself would not inform anyone as to the reasons for discharge, except the Civil Service Commission. The record
would be public and would be kept and persons could
come and examine it if they decided to investigate the
matter ( P. 85~86). If he resigned the record would
show he had resigned.

Q.

"In the discharge situation you would tell
people he had been discharged for misconduct'
A. ''No, I wouldn't tell them that unless they
came and investigated it."
Q. ''Didn't you tell Mr. Fox that would be revealed to persons inquiring of his employability~

A.

''No, I didn't. I told him that would be revealed to the Civil Service Commission.''

This constitutes the testimony of Chief Piercey.
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Assistant Chief Thompson testified (P. 106) that
Chief Piercey "n1entioned to him (Fox) the thought of
resigning in preference to being discharged, because of
the thought that being discharged, and if he took it to
the Civil Servi-ce Commission, it would, of ne-cessity,
mean a public hearing, and the charges 'vould be public
and there would be a lot of mess about it. It was in a
very kind way that it was put (P. 117), in a way of kindness; that the facts of the case would be public and Fox
would have to answer to the charge, at a public hearing
and we would have to prefer the charges. It would be
difficult for him to get employment after discharge.''
Assistant Chief Ward testified (P. 124):
''Fox asked Chief Piercey what would happen if he didn't resign and the Chief informed him
that he would be discharged, and reviewed· his
rights with the Civil Service Commission if he
was discharg·ed. (P. 125-26) The Chief said he
would have to prefer charges and if Harold elected to fight them in Civil Service he would have
to substantiate his charges and it would be a pub. lie hearing, that the Civil Service hearing would
be a public hearing. His decision was that he
would not resign. (P. 129) He (Piercey) did say
that when p;eople would call he would have to say,
of necessity, that he (Fox) was discharged; and
·then of course, maybe they would ask the reason
why he was discharged and then he would have
to tell them why he was discharged. The record
was public property. -If he resigned the record
would show he resigned.''
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.Assistant Chief Smith testified, in reply to a question as to what was said concerning the effect of a discharge on plaintiff's ability to get 'a job in this community (P. 140) :
''Harold asked the question, if he didn't resign and he was discharged what the difference
would he, and the Chief explained to him that the
department records are kept on each man and if
he resigns the only in~ormation the card would
carry is that he had resigned; but if he were discharged, then of course, the card would carry the
record he was disch~rged and why he was discharged.

Q. ''.And Chief Piercey told him there would be
a public hearing, ·and there would be publicity given to his action, isn't that true~
.A.

''I don't remember that, no sir. I remember
he said if he resigned there would be no publicity attached to it, that is all there would
be to it just a resignation."

Assistant Chief Ward testified:
Piercey told Fox (P. 147-48): ''Well, as far
as dismissal was concerned that it would be pretty
much a ·matter of. public knowledge of what went
on, especially if Harold wanted to fight a decision,
that there would he a lot of court action. On the
other hand, if he would resign, he would be spared
all that. He made particular reference to the fact
that Harold would have to have work of some
kind and as he was seeking a position somewhere
else these p;eople would call the Chief's office for
a recommendation, or his record on the Fire Department. That with the resignation he would
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have a clear case .... that the Chief would simply
tell them he had resigned from the Fire Department. On the other hand, if he was discharged,
then he would probably have to answer the questions as to reason for dismissal. In other words,
Chief Piercey told Mr. Fox if he resigned, his
chances for getting employment were much better
than if he were discharged as a result of, the
things Chief Piercey would have to tell the people
when they called regarding Mr. Fox.''
It should be remembered· that the alleged threats
'vhich plaintiff charges Chief Piercey made, and which,
according to plaintiff's own testimony, were the controlling faactors in overcoming his will and filling him with
fear, were made, according to plaintiff's testimony, at
the meeting of 11 :00 A.M. Fox was told to come back at
1:30 and receive his discharge. At that time a letter of
discharge was handed him and accepted by him. He
shook hands with Assistant Chief Ward and White and
departed. Sometime later he came ·back, and, according
to his own testimony above referred to, asked if it was
too late to resign. As to what was said and done at that
time the testimony of Chief Piercey and the 2 Assistant
Chiefs is pretty much in harmony with Fox's testimony.
Chief Piercey testified (P. 73):
"He (Fox) was invited in and he said, 'Is it
too late to resign~' I said, 'No' .... then he said
that he would like to resign. I asked if he wanted
any help, or if he wanted to write his resignation
out. It was conveyed to me by Mr Fox that he
would like some help. I asked the secretary to
come in. They left the office and in a few·moments
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Fox returned with his letter of resignation. He
handed me his resignation. I read the resignation.
I tor·e up the discharge.''
Assistant Chief Ward testified (P. 127) that when
Fox came back to the Office after receiving the letter of
discharge, he said :
''Have you sent that letter to the Civil Service
Commission yet~'' The Chief said, 'No.' And he
said, 'Is it too late to resign~' And the Chief
said, 'No.' And at that time he offered to resign
rather than to keep the discharge.''
The secretary assisted him at his request in writing
up the letter of resignation. He handed it to ~Chief Piercey
and the l·atter tore up the letter of discharge.
Assistant
. Chief White testified (P. 145):
"A short time later he (F-ox) came back and
wanted to know if it was too late to resign, if the
papers had gone down. The Chief told him, 'No.'
He then asked permission to resign. ''
He was asked if he wanted help and upon his saying
he wo-qld, the secretary was called and the 2 of them went
into the outer room. A little later Fox came back with
the resignation, which the Chief accepted. Then Fox
asked about getting back his bail money at the City jail.
The Chief sent White with Fox to the Prosecutor's office
and there Fox was released. Fox there excused himself
and said, ''Now I have decided to resign, I had better
call my Attorney, I better let him know.'' And he left
Chief White and went to the phone.
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The trial court in paragraph II of its Findings of
Fact found:
''That at the time of the signing of said letter
of resignation plaintiff was frightened and alarmed and under the influence of fear, duress and
coercion caused and created by the statements of
defendant Piercey concerning the detrimental effect that a discharge would have upon plaintiff's
opportunity for employment and the detrimental
publicity that would probably result from such a
discharge; that said letter was involuntarily given
by plaintiff Fox while under the aforementioned
influences and while frightened and in great fear
for his own and the economic welfare of his
family."
The Trial C·ourt made the following conclusion of
law:
"That the letter of resignation of August 6,
1948, was obtained by duress and coercion from
plaintiff and said letter of resignation was involuntarily signed by plaintiff while he was under
the influence of coercive statements made by defendant J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Salt Lake City
Fire Department.''
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The following are the points upon which appellants
intend to rely for a reversal of the judgment of the
Trial Court.·
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I
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELE ..
MENTS ALLE·GED AND RELIED UPON BY HIM IN HIS
COMPLAINT AS CONSTITUTING THE DURESS AND COERCION THAT O·VERCAME HIS FREEDOM OF MIND AND
ACTION AND PRODUCED THE FEAR THAT RESULTED IN
AN INVO·LUNTARY RESIGNATION.

II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT, RELATING TO DURESS
PRACTICED UPON PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PIERCEY,
ARE NOT BASED UPO·N THE FACTORS THAT PLAINTIFF
HIMSELF

ASSERTED

AND

RELIED

UPON,

IN HIS

COMPLAINT AND BY HIS EVIDENCE, AS PRODUCING
LEGAL DURESS, BUT ARE FACTORS THAT THE COURT
ITSELF INJECTED AS AMOUNTING TO LEGAL DURESS,
WITHOUT

THERE

BEING

ANY

EVIDENCE

THAT

SUCH FACTORS DID, IN FACT, HAVE SUCH AN INFLUENCE, UPON

PLAINTIFF'S MIND, AS

TO DESTROY

PLAINTIFF'S POWER O·F INDEPENDENT VOLUNTARY
ACTION IN SUBMITTING HIS RESIGNATION.

III
THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW O·R THE JUDGMENT.
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ARGUl\!ENT
I
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS ALLEGED AND RELIED UPON BY HllVI IN HIS
COMPLAINT AS CO·NSTITUTING THE DURESS AND COERCION THAT OVERCAME HIS FREEDOM OF MIND AND
ACTION AND PRODUCED THE FEAR THAT RESULTED IN
AN INVOLUNTARY RESIGNATION.

In the st·atement of facts \Ye quoted the allegations
of plaintiff's complaint alleging the elements of duress
relied upon by him to set aside his resignation. ·He alleged that Chief Piercey threatened, unless plaintiff resigned, ''to blast and smear plaintiff in every newspaper
in Salt Lake ·City," ''and that he would make it somiserable that plaintiff could not secure a job in said City,"
''that if plaintiff did not resign his position defendant
would discharge him anq give him more publicity than
he ever wanted in his life." He further alleged that
these threats created in plaintiff such great fear for the
economic welfare of himself and family that he involuntarily signed the letter of resignation ·while under the
influence of the duress and threat of Piercey.
The court specifically found, however, contrary to
the allegations of the complaint. It found that Piercey·
did not threaten to blast :and smear plaintiff in every
newspaper in Salt Lake City nor did he threaten to make

it so plaintiff ·could not secure a job in Salt Lake City.
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There is no evidence anywhere in the record that Piercey
threatened to give plaintiff "more publicity than he had
ever wanted in his life.'' It is apparent, therefore, that
the plaintiff did not prove a single element relied upon
by him as having produced the fear that overcame plaintiff's ability to act as a free agent such as would render
his act of resignation involuntary.
With respect to these allegations, all that was proved,
or found by the court, was that Piercey told him he would
be discharged unless he resigned. And jn this regard
there is neither allegation nor proof, nor is it found by
the court, that being given the alternative of resigning
or being discharged had any effect to produce fear in
plaintiff's mind. Instead the court found that Piercey
"informed plaintiff that a discharge would be accompanied by detrimental publicity .and would seriously and
detrimentally affect plaintiff's opportunities for obtaining employment in Salt Lake City :and vicinity ... that at
the time of signing said letter of resignation plaintiff
was frightened and alarmed under the influence of feru·,
duress, and coercion caused and created by the statements of defendant Piercey concerning the detrimental
effect that a discharge would have upon plaintiff's opportunities for employment and the detrimental publicity
that would probably result from such a discharge."
In these Findings there is not the slightest implication of any threat by Piercey. Plaintiff would be, and
was, as fully aware as Piercey ·concerning the natural
effects that "\\7 0uld flow from his being discharged in the
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'vay of publicity and the effect of a disch~arge for cause
on his opportunities for finding other employment. We
reiterate, plaintiff hin1self clearly indicated, both in his
pleading and in his evidence, his fear and its inY.oluntary
influence arose solely and entirely out of and because of
the threats he alleged and testified defendant Piercey
made, namely : to take personal action, to use the newspapers to blast and smear, to see to it that plaintiff did
not secure employment elsewhere. Without those threats
there could be no fear, no involuntary action. And the
court finds there were no such threats. This is the equivalent of finding, to say the least, that plaintiff was mistaken about any such threats having been made and if
the threats in fact were not made defendant Piercey
could not be charged with having practiced duress, even
though plaintiff mistakenly thought the t~reats had been
made. This finding is also equivalent to a finding that
plaintiff did not allege or testify to the truth on this
most important issue. It hardly seems possible that
plaintiff could have arrived at the conclusion th·at Piercey
had made these threats by mistaking or misunderstanding what was said by Mr. Piercey. And yet the court
finds the plaintiff was full of fear when he signed his
resignation. This is only ~an assumption on the part of
the court. It is not plaintiff's position either by allegation or proof. And to determine whether p.Iaintiff was
laboring under duress, the court is not at liberty to interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pose its ideas as to what 1night or did produce fear sufficient to produce duress in the plaintiff. It is bound to
look to the effect on the plaintiff alone, even though the
same circumstances might be sufficient, if relied upon,
to produce duress over some other person 'and the facts
indicate such duress in fact obtained.
The rule, ~n this regard, is well stated in 17 Amer.
Jur. under Duress And Undue Influence, page 884, Section 11 as follows:
''There is no legal· standard of resistance
with which the person acted upon must comply
at the peril of being remediless for a wrong done
to him, and no general rule as to the sufficiency
of facts to produce duress. The question in each
case is, was the person so acted upon by threats
of the person claiming the benefit of the contract,
for the purpose of obtaining such contract, as to
he bereft of the quality of mind essential to the
making of a contract, ~and was the eontract, thereby obtained~ Hence, under this theory duress is
to be tested, not by the nature of the threats, but
rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the
victim. The means used to produce that condition, the age, sex, state of health, and men tal characteristics of the alleged injured party, are all
evidentiary, merely, of the ultimate fact in issue,
of 1.vhether such person was bereft of the free
exercise of his will power. Obviously what will
accomplish this result cannot justly be tested by
any other standard than that of the particular
person acted upon. His resisting power, under
all the circumstances of the situation and not any
arbitrary standard, is to be conside~ed in determining whether there was duress.''
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II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT, RELATING TO DURESS
PRACTICED UPON PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PIERCEY,
ARE NOT BASED UPO·N THE FACTORS THAT PLAINTIFF
HIMSELF

ASSERTED

AND

RELIED

UPON,

IN

HIS

COMPLAINT AND BY HIS EVIDENCE, AS PRODUCING
LEGAL DURESS, BUT ARE FACTORS THAT THE COURT
ITSELF INJECTED AS AMOUNTING TO LEGAL DURESS,
WITHOUT

THERE

BEING

ANY

EVIDENCE

THAT

SUCH FACTORS DID, IN FACT, HAVE SUCH AN INFLUENCE, UPON PLAINTIFF'S MIND, AS

TO

DESTROY

PLAINTIFF'S PO·WER O·F INDEPENDENT VOLUNTARY
ACTION IN SUBMITTING HIS RESIGNATION.

The point relied on under this subdivision II is
closely allied with point I just discussed, and much that
is written under I is applicable here, including the exerpt from Amer. Jur. Before p-roceeding further we
deem it advisable to determine what constitutes'' duress''.
This court, in Ellison v. Pingree, 64 U. 468, 231 P. 827 ·
stated: "What constitutes duress is so well and clearly
stated in 12 C. J. P. 396, Section 310, that w·e here reproduce and adop.t the statement as the law upon the
subject. It is there said:
'Duress is that degree of constraint or danger,
either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient in severity or in apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness. It consists not merely in the
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act .of imprisonment or other hardship to which
the party was subjected, but in the state of mind
produced by those circumstances, and in which
the :act sought to be a voided was done. Of course,
the agreement must have been entered into because of the imprisonment, or of fear of the
threatened injury or imprisonment, otherwise
there is no duress. Renee duress will no.t ordinarily invalidate a contract entered into ~after
opportunity for deliberate action. Duress by mere
advice, direction influence, and persuasion is
not recognized in law. Nor can a charge of
legal duress be based on mere vexation and annoyance, mere pecuniary distress, a threat to
injure one's credit, or the refusal to surrender
property on which one has a lien.' ''
The court goes on to quote with approval from 9 R.
C. L. pag·e 717, Section 7 as follows :
" 'It is generaUy held, however, that the
threat must be of such a nature and niade under
such circumstances as to constitute a reasonable
and adequate cause to control the will of the
threatened person and must have that effect, and
the act sought to be avoided must be performed by
the person while in that conditio·n; and that an
act, such, for instance as the voluntary and free
acknowledgment of a .deed, subsequent to the time
when the threats were employed, will not be considered as having been done under duress. If,
however, the threats were long continued, ~and the
act which it is sought to avoid was done such a
short time thereafter as to indicate that the mind
of the person was still under the influence of the
threats, it has been held that this will constitute
an act done under duress. The mere fact that a
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person is in fear of some impending peril or injury, or in a state of mental plerturbation at the
time of doing any act, is not sufficient ground
for holding that the act was done under duress;
nor can there be duress per minas from mere
advice, direction, influence or persuasion.' ''
We quote the following questions asked of plaintiff by his counsel and his answers thereto. ( P. 40) :

Q. ''What was your primary consideration in
the signing of this resignation on that occasion, in your mind~ What was uppermost in
your mind~

A. ''I didn't want him to carry out his threats
on me.
Q. "By 'threats' what do you mean, Mr
A.

Fox~

''He said he would blast me and smear me all
over the newspapers; and if he did, it would
be difficult in obtaining employment.

Q. "Mr. Fox, did you have any other reason for
signing this resignation, other than the threats
and statements Chief Piercey had made to
you there that morning~
A.

"I did not. "

The threats and statements of defendant Piercey,
here referred to, could only mean the threats and statenlents plaintiff testified were made that morning. Those
threats and statements are contained in the testimony
just quoted and in testimony previously given as to what
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this Piercey had said to him that morning. This latter
testimony is as follows (P. 37-38):
Fox~

Q.

"What did he (Piercey) say to you, Mr.

A.

''He told me to resign. He asked me if I was
going to resign. I told him no, I wasn't going
to resign.

Q.

''Then what did he say to

A.

''He told me I had to work somewhere; that
I wasn't going to work there no more, and if
I didn't resign I was going to be discharged
and I told him I wasn't going to resign.

Q.

''Was there any further conversation be-tween you and Chief Piercey there at his
office on this morning~

A.

''Yes. He told me if I didn't resign, he was
going to blast me and make it miserable for
me to find a job. I told him I wouldn't resign.

you~

Q. '' Th·en, did any of the other chiefs, while you
were there, make any comment to you, or
enter into the conversation~
A.

''I think he asked one of them - asked the
-chiefs if they didn't think it would be better
if I didn't resign, ·and they said yes, it would
be better if I resigned.

Q. "Then what occurred, Mr.
A.

Fox~

''I just told him I wouldn't resign.

Q. ''What occured in the office after
A.

''He told me to be hack at 1 :30.

Q.

''Did you then

A.

"I then left."

that~

leave~
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The foregoing is all of the testimony of plaintiff as
to 'vhat was said by Chief Piercey or others. Plaintiff
himself testified that there was no other reason for his
signing the letter of resignation than the threats and
statements above quoted. But the court found that defendant never made the threats. The only statement
made by Piercey, not involving threats of publicity and
difficulty in securing other employment, was that if
plaintiff did not resign he would be discharged. But
plaintiff neither claimed nor proved that that statement
created any fear in him or overpowered his free will and
judgment. Furthermore, the court did not find that the
mere alternative of resigning or being discharged gave
rise to such fear in plaintiff's mind as to amount to
duress. It found, rather, that it was the statements of
Piercey concerning the detrimental effect that a discharge would have upon plaintiff's opportunities for
employment and the detrimental publicity that would
probably result from a discharge that caused plaintiff
to become so frightened and alarmed that he did not act
·as a free agent in signing his resignation. We submit
that such a finding is wholly gratuitous. The plaintiff
did not so allege, nor did he so testify, nor is there any
evidence in the record that would justify such a conclusion. Plaintiff testified that his fear arose solely from
the threat made by Piercey to smear :and blast him in the
newspaper and to make it so miserable th·at plaintiff
could not get employment. We submit, therefore, that
the court has attempted to interpolate a new and different source of

fe~ar

unsustained by the testimony of Mr.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

Fox, or any other testimony, and has used such nevv
source of fear as the basis for concluding that plaintiff
was ~acting under duress when he·signed his resignation.
The statements found by the court to be the fearproducing statements made by defendant Piercey contained no threat; they contained nothing that plaintiff
was not fully cognizant of. They were only defendant
Piercey's conclusions as to what would result and fall
within the category of mere advice, direction, influence
or persuasion, as to which there can be no duress, as
stated in the quotation from R.C.L. quoted in Ellison v.
Pingree, Supra.
III
THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW OR THE JUDGMENT.

We have demonstrated that plaintiff failed to prove
the duress charged by him and that the court, to find
duress, had to adopt a position not relied upon by plaintiff either in his pleading or in his testimony. We shall
now consider whether the record as a whole sustained
the court's findings of duress -and its conclusion of law
that plaintiff's resignation was not his voluntary act.
We· submit that the _Findings of Fact, on
show that no duress, such as would vitiate
resignation, was practiced upon plaintiff by
Piercey. In the absence of ~any threatened

their face,
plaintiff's
defendant
action by
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Piereey relative to influencing unfavorable publicity,
whatever publicity would result would depend entirely
upon what the newspapers might choose to publish. Fox
was in as good a position as the Chief, or perhaps better,
to guess what the newspapers would do. He would certainly be in possession of all of the facts concerning his
.misconduct "\vhile in the employ of the Fire Department.
Certainly he could not assume falsehoods would be published or that the newspapers would take a position adverse and deterimental to his interests. There could be,
therefore, no compulsion or duress arise out of a mere
statement by Piercey that detrimental publicity would
result from a discharge, a mere matter of opinion only,
entirely relative, being without any sp·ecification as to
the nature or ·extent of the source of the expected publicity. Under the definition of duress, heretofore quoted,
we submit that the findings of -the court show .on their
face that no duress was practiced by defendant Piercey
and that he made no threats of doing anytping detrimental to the plaintiff other than to inform plaintiff
that he could no longer remain in the employ of the
Fire department.
Looking at the record as a whole we further submit
there is not sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of
duress or a conclusion of law that plaintiff's resignation
was not voluntarily given. The question here is not whether a thre·at of discharge would, as a matter of general
application, be sufficient to produce duress. The question of duress here involved is to be determined. by considering, not general principles, but the mind and resisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive power of the particular plaintiff and the evidence
he himself produced to show the overcoming of his free
agency and power· to act voluntarily. If, in fact, he were
not overcome by the statements of defendant Piercey,
then there would be no duress, regardless of what might
be considered duress in any other case.
The evidence is without dispute that it was at the
11:00 A.M. meeting that plaintiff was informed he would
be discharged and was given the opportunity to resign.
It was at this meeting that plaintiff said the threats that
caused his fear were made. It was likewise at this meeting that defendant Piercey explained to pl·aintiff that if
he vvere discharged and he resisted by an appeal, Piercey
would then have to advise the Civil Service C·ommission
of the specific charges ; that a public he·aring would be
held and testimony would be given to substantiate the
charges. It was at this meeting, ~also, that the Chief
pointed out to plain tiff that if h~ were discharged and
people should inquire as to plaintiff's former connection with the Fire Department, the record, being public,
could be investigated by those interested. According to
Mr. Fox, he stoutly and resolutely refused to resign ·and
stated he would fight the case. He was told to be back
at 1:30 and his discharge would be ready. He came back
and received and accepted the letter of discharge after
defendant Piercey had again explained his right to
appeal and the procedure prescribed by the rules for
service of a letter of discharge. After receiving the
letter of discharge he asked them (Piercey ~and his 2
assistant chiefs) if that was all. And Chief Piercey said
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that was all. "So I shook hands with Chief White and I
think it was Chief Smith and said it had been nice working \vith them. And I walked out." (P. 39)
According to Piercey's testimony, which is not in
any way contradicted by Fox (P. 73), before Fox left
with the discharge he stated, ''I will fight it." Up to
this time Fox had, for all intents and purposes, been
discharged. All that remained to be done was to transmit the record to the Civil Service Commission. Notwithstanding anything that had been said previously,
Mr. Fox had not been overpowered and cowed into resigning. The matter seemed to be ~a closed incident and
Fox was prepared to take it before the Civil Service
Commission on appeal. He had had time, about 2.~
hours after the supposed threats and statements had
been made, in which to deliberate the course he would
pursue notwithstanding such threats and statements. He
still persisted in his decision to t~ake a discharge and
fight it. No new threats were made after the 11:00
meeting. No new intimidations occurred. The threats
or statements of Piercey did not deter him from accepting the letter of discharge.
In about 10 minutes Fox returned and asked if the
record of discharge had been sent in and if it was too
late to resign. This was his own voluntary .act. No one
compelled him to return and trade his discharge for a
resignation. That decision was his, and his alone.
What was the impelling motive for this change of
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come with fear because Piercey had told him "a discharge would be accompanied by detriment~al publicity
and would seriously and detrimentally affect plaintiff's
opportunities for obtaining employment,'' merely
Piercey's opinion as to what the consequences might be,
not any threat on the part of Piercey. But that isn't
Fox's version. He states definitely that the prime consideration that impelled him to resign "\\ras the threat by
Piercey, unless he resigned, Piercey would "blast and
smear me all over the newspapers; and if he did, it would
be difficult in obtaining employment," and he had no
other reason for signing the resignation other than such
threat. (P. 40) It is clear from this that it was not the
threat of discharge and the natural attendant consequences relative to publicity or future employment that
impelled him to resign. It was the personal malignant
interest, which Fox claims Chief Piercey threatened he
'vould take to see that Fox was blasted and smeared in
the newspapers and to see that he got no other employment, that impelled Fox to return with the letter of discharge after having once accepted it and to submit his
resignation. But the court specifically found that Chief
Piercey did not so threaten. There is, therefore, no evidence to sustain the finding that Fox's resignation was
involuntarily given while under the influence of duress
and coercion.
What happened ~after signing the resignation is likewise definite proof again·st the court's finding that
Fox was filled and overcome with fear when he signed
his resignation. After submitting his resignation and
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the destruction of the letter of discharge, Fox asked
the assistance of ,Chief Piercey in getting a return of
the bail money he had posted at the City j~ail by being
rele'ased on his own reconnaissance. Defendant Piercey
dispatched Assistant Chief White to go with him to the
City Prosecutor to see if this could be done. The bail
money was returned to him. While at the Prosecutor's
office Fox said, "now I have decided to resign, I had
better call my attorney, I better let him know." (P. 146)
Do these circumstances in-dicate a person overcome with
fear and laboring under coercion from defendant
Piercey~

While, as before indicated, each case involving
duress must be decided upon its own peculiar facts and
so decisions in other cases may not furnish much
assistance, we desire to call the court's attention to the
few cas·es which we have been able to find involving the
resignation under a claim of duress· from a public office.
That a resignation could be suggested and advised
as an alternative to preferring charges, where there
was no threat and the officer was not obliged to sign
the resignation, and that a resignation under such conditions would be upheld it is clearly indicated in the
following language from Thomp,son vs. Civil S:ervice
Commission, 103 Utah 162, 134 P. 2d 188 p. 192.
''It is common knowledge that when grounds
are found, or believed to exist, which would justify formal charges against an officer for removal
from office, or when such charges are preferred,
the officer is ofttimes given the opportunity to
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resign instead of facing publication with charges,
a hearing, and removal.''
The precise question was decided in the case of
People ex rel W a.llace vs. D·iehl, 63 N. Y. S. 3-67, affirmed
in '60 N. E. 1118. In St-ate vs. Ness, 139 Ohio St. 309, 39
N.E. 2nd 849, the rule of the Civil· Service Commission
provided that ''acceptance by an appointing officer of
the resignation of a person discharged before final
action by the Civil Service Commission will be considered a withdrawal of the charges and the separation
of the employee thus resigning shall be entered as a
resignation and the proceedings shall_ be dismissed without judgment." It was held in that case that a resignation submitted by a police officer while charges were
pending ·against him was not null and void under this
rule. This clearly shows that resigning as an alternative to standing trial upon charges for dismissal does
not necessarily imply or involve duress. Certainly it
is not to be supposed that the Civil Service Commission
would make a rule permitting something to be done
'vhich would involve duress as a matter of law.

Kramer vs. Board of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal.
App. 396, 179 P. 216. In this case plaintiff, a member
of the police department, was given a three months'
leave of absence to go into business as a means of
cutting down the cost of the police department, being
assured that the leave could be extended for one year.
He purchased a ~tock of merchandise and engaged in
business. Within three months he was ordered to return
to duty. Upon his requesting additional time he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
infqrmed that he must either report for duty or resign.
He protested this order but presented his resignation,
which was accepted. He brought a suit for reinstatement claiming that his resignation was not voluntary
but was induced by duress ;and coercion. The court
holds that the resignation was not induced by duress
or coercion but was voluntary, saying:

''In order for the action 9f the board of
police commissioners in presenting to the plaintiff
the alternative of either resigning from or returning to his post of duty in the police department to have savored of duress or coercion, such
action must have been unlawful under the long
accepted definitions of these terms.
"In the case of St.ate v. Laden, 104 Minn.
252, 116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, which
involved a resignatioJ?. from office, it was held
that the coercion or duress which would· render
such resignation either void or voidable must be
such as would ·exist where one by the unlawful
conduct. of another was induced to resign his office under circumstances which deprived him of
his free will.
''Measured by these definitions it must be
concluded that the plaintiff's resignation from
the police department was not induced by either
duress or .coercion, but that the same was voluntary, and hence, upon its acceptance by the board
of police commissioners, worked a final severance
of the relation. of the plaintiff as a police officer
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with the police department of the city and county
of San Francisco. ''
Board of Education vs. Rose, 147 S. W. 2nd 83, 132
A.L.R. 969. Here the plaintiff resigned as a county
superintendent of schools pursuant to a compromise
agreement between two factions of the board of education whereby litigation over the right of a member
of the board to hold office 'Yas discontinued and charges
filed against plaintiff were to be dropped and he was
to resign. Plaintiff claimed his resignation was obtained
under duress under the law stated in 46 C. J. 980, as
follows:
~'A

resignation signed as an alternative to
having charges made against the signer cannot
be said to be given by the party resigning of his
oWn free will, and can be repudiated at any time.''
The court first points out that this text is based
entirely upon the case of People ex rel 0"0onnor vs.
Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, "in which a conditional resignation was obtained from a Civil Service employee by
threat of a superior officer to file charges against hin1
and the resignation was accepted three years after it
"ras tendered under circumstances which did not justify
a discharge of the employee.'' The court held that the
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facts of the case before it did not bring it within the
rule from Corpus Juris saying:
''No member of the county board made any
threat of any kind with reference to filing charges
against the app.ellee or any statement that appellee would be removed as a result of the hearing
on the charges.''
It seems that plaintiff was fearful of an adverse
decision on the cha·rges filed against him and thought
the decision .thereon would be against him. The court
points out he could have appealed from an adverse decision, but he chose rather to resign. ''No such duress
was imposed upon him such as entitled him to withdraw
his resignation which had been accepted.''
In 132 A. L. R. 975 is a note on the subject of
duress as ground for withdrawing or avoiding resignation from public office. Some of the cases above
cited are there cited. The other cases referred to in
the note involved factors of duress which are not
present in the instant case. The case of" Pe.op·le ex rel
0 'Connor vs. Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, referred to in
the ea.se of Board of Education vs .. Rose, supra, is re-.
ferred to in said note. That case, however, is distinguishable from the instant case as is pointed out by the court
in the case of Board of Education vs. Rose.
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In the case of State vs. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116
N. W. 486, the evidence showed that the officer was
threatened with personal violence and with the filing
of charges of embezzlement ag·ainst him and that his
farm would be taken from him to cover his shortage
unless he resigned.
In the case ·of Kidd vs. State Civil Service Com'inission, 55 P. 2nd 245, the resignation was obtained
under false representations and promis-es as to reinstatement, the court saying that it appears ''that ~appel
lant's signature to the resignation was obtained by
false representations in that he signed the same to
protect his civil service standing believing the doctor's
statements to be true.''
The other cases cited in the note do not disclose
the facts out of which the ·duress arose.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that plaintiff wholly failed
to sustain the burden of proving the duress and coercion
relied upon by him in his amended complaint. The court
specifically found this to .be a fact. Under such a condition of the record the court should have entered
judgment against the plaintiff dismissing his complaint.
Instead, it proceeded to find some other basis for making
a finding of duress and coercion and concluded that such
duress ·and coercion must have been in the mind of the
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plaintiff although he did not so indicate and although
he clearly indicated by his own te~timony that he was
not moved by the considerations found by the court in
submitting his resignation. We further submit that the
record as a whole fails to support even the theory
adopted by the court and fails to sustain the legal conclusion arrived at by the court that plaintiff submitted
his resignation while under the influence of fear and
duress. We respectfully submit that the case should
be reversed and the lower court directed to enter a
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRIS'TENSEN

·City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN
A. PRATT KESLER

Assistants
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